Why India needs to recalibrate its China strategy to bounce back as a regional power

It's not easy living next door to Alice. China is not just any old power, but one that is knocking at the door of superpowerdom. If there was a time when India thought its own rise could present an alternative vision of political and economic development for the world, the last couple of years has put paid to such aspirations.

Having said that, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's China visit had its moments of quiet assertion. The border defence agreement may not prevent another Depsang-like incident, but it serves to enmesh China - Gulliver-like - in a web of confidence-building steps on a disputed boundary. The transborder rivers pact does the same thing - though it took Singh's personal intervention to bring the Chinese around.

The tone of the visit was especially pleasant. The Chinese leadership rolled out befitting hospitality to a neighbouring leader who was doing a valedictory lap. It was probably a coincidence, but the last two summits between India and China have been preceded by acts of Indian assertiveness. Li Keqiang's visit in May was in danger when South Block told Beijing to step back from Depsang, or else.

Diplomats preparing for Singh's visit suddenly found they had to drop a big visa liberalisation agreement after India refused to go ahead with it as a protest against China giving stapled visas to two young archers from Arunachal Pradesh. Though China refuses to acknowledge India's protest, privately they were taken aback.

As China becomes a global power, its assertiveness and growing military might makes the Asia-Pacific region nervous. India's challenge lies in successfully hedging its bets on both ends of the spectrum. On the China end, India has quietly been building its own string of relationships along China's periphery. Japan is now India's closest strategic partner, next only to the US. India will be the first country to receive dual-use amphibious ships from Japan, which has a significance beyond the immediate.

India has overcome its neglect of Australia and a closer security relationship moored in the "Indo-Pacific" holds greater promise. South Korea has indicated its intention of upgrading a successful economic relationship into a more defence/strategic one, top of the agenda when Park Geun-Hye travels to India in January. Mongolia, despite being overshadowed by China, has reached out to India in ways which has not been reciprocated in any responsible manner. On the other hand, India is hesitant to get into multi-lateral alliances that target China. All along China's periphery, everyone is hedging, looking for alternatives, but with a hobbled economy and a catatonic political establishment, India is yet to be that choice.

India has been more welcoming of the US's "rebalance" to Asia, but at the back of the mind remains the memory of a "G-2". That complicates India's geopolitical choices vis-a-vis China.

The fundamental determinant of how India deals with China is what kind of a power China is likely to become. For most Indians, David Shambaugh's description of China finds resonance. China, he says, is a "narrow-minded self-interested, realist state, seeking only to maximise its own interests and power... Its economic policies are mercantilist and its diplomacy is passive. China is also a lonely strategic power... At the same time, China displays periodic evidence of being a dissatisfied, frustrated, aggrieved and an angry nation that seeks redress against those that have wronged it in the past or with which it has disagreements at present."